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REPLY
WHAT IS A STATE CONSTITUTION?
James A. Gardner*
For some time now, judges and scholars have been debating the
proper methods for interpreting state constitutions. The inquiry has
typically proceeded along the familiar lines of federal constitutional
analysis: I have before me the (state) constitution-what do I do now?
How do I go about making sense of it? Posing the question in this way,
however, conceals as much as it reveals, for to call something a
"constitution" in the first place-to apply that particular label to a
document-is not so much to begin the analysis as to end it.
We know what a "constitution" is; it is, among other things, a
framework for self-governance consisting of a set of written
instructions issued by a sovereign people to their governmental agents.
To know this much is to know a great deal indeed about how to
interpret such a document. Like the terms "contract," ".will," or
"statute," the term "constitution" signifies a conventional legal category.
To assign a document to a specific category is precisely to decide that it
is a certain kind of document with certain properties that fix and
constrain the modes of legal analysis appropriate to its interpretation.
In The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism,1 I argued that
the efforts of state courts to construe state constitutions using traditional
modes of constitutional analysis have yielded extremely poor results. 2 I
suggested that the reason for this failure resides not in any inadequacy in
traditional constitutional analysis, but in its misapplication to state
constitutions. 3 This is because state constitutions by and large do not fit
comfortably within our standard definition of "constitutions." Typically,
state constitutions do not seem to have resulted from reasoned
deliberation on issues of self-governance, or to express the fundamental
Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; B.A. 1980, Yale
University; J.D. 1984, University of Chicago. Thanks to Lise Gelertner and Jay Mootz for
helpful suggestions and comments. ©1993 James A. Gardner.
1. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 761 (1992).
2. Id. at 778-805.
3. Id. at 812-32.
1025
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
values or unique character of distinct polities. Lacking these qualities,
state constitutions, to put it bluntly, are not "constitutions" as we
understand the term. But if they are not constitutions, what are they, and
how should we interpret them?
The participants in this Roundtable have offered a variety of
responses to these difficult questions. 4 None of them, however, pursues
the matter far enough, so what I want to do here is build on their work
by tentatively sketching a framework in which to think about the nature
of state constitutions. The key prop in this structure turns out to be,
unsurprisingly, our system of federalism, which grants the states
independent power to pursue their own visions of good self-
government.
Focusing on federalism illuminates two important features of state
constitutional law as it is practiced today. First, to the extent that state
constitutional law is irrelevant in the contemporary United States-and I
believe it is largely irrelevant, although it need not remain so---
federalism paradoxically makes it irrelevant by design. Second, notions
of federalism help explain the poor condition of contemporary state
constitutional discourse, and lay bare the poignant dilemma state courts
face: in order to preserve their role in the federal order, state courts must
talk about state constitutions as though they were "real" constitutions,
even during periods of federal constitutional ascendancy when state
constitutions may not look, and certainly do not function, like the
genuine article.
I. THE CRITIQUE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE
To put these issues in perspective, it may be helpful to begin with a
brief summary of my earlier critique of state constitutional discourse.
The centerpiece of that critique was a study of every state constitutional
ruling issued in 1990 by the highest courts of seven states. 5 My review
of these decisions revealed that these courts (1) turned only infrequently
and grudgingly to their state constitutions, (2) failed to specify whether
their decisions rested on state or federal constitutional grounds, (3)
frequently followed in "lockstep" with federal rulings on similar issues,
4. Others are also working on the same issues. A valuable analysis, for example,
can be found in G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 1169
(1992).
5. Gardner, supra note 1, at 778-805.
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and (4) failed to identify or rely upon any state constitutional history that
might help contextualize differences between the federal and state
constitutions. 6 What these findings show, I argued, is that state
constitutional discourse is impoverished; that is, state courts have failed
to develop a language in which it is possible to debate intelligibly the
meaning of the state constitution. This is a significant defect, not only
because it directly contradicts the predictions of scholars and judges
associated with the New Federalism movement, 7 but, more
importantly, because the function of constitutional law is precisely to
serve as a forum for debating the meaning of the constitution. 8
What accounts for the failure of state constitutional law to fulfill its
most central function? In my view, state courts do not talk intelligibly
about state constitutions because they simply cannot-because to talk
about state constitutions as though they were constitutions is to talk in a
way that rings false, that makes no sense. The culprit here, it seems to
me, is the conceptual framework imposed by the doctrine of state
constitutionalism. According to this doctrine, the people of a state
constitute a distinct, self-governing polity, with their own set of
fundamental values and their own unique character, and the state
constitution is a direct expression of this distinctiveness. 9
The state constitutionalism framework does not hold up well upon
examination of actual state constitutions and constitutional law. Most
state constitutions, for example, are filled with trivial and occasionally
silly provisions.10 Some states change constitutions frequently-
Louisiana has done so eleven times-and others have altered their
present constitutions by literally hundreds of amendments. 11 These
factors undermine any sense of a state constitution as a deliberate,
considered expression of fundamental values; moreover, to the extent
that state constitutions can be said to reveal the character of the polity,
the character so revealed is hardly the sober and reflective one
contemplated by constitutionalism.
More fundamentally, the notion that constitutional differences reflect
differences in the character and fundamental values of the peoples of the
various states is one that cannot survive a realistic appraisal of
6. Id. at 780-94.
7. Id. at 771-78.
8. Id. at 767-70.
9. Id. at 812-18.
10. Id. at 818-19.
11. Id. at 819-20.
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contemporary American life. Americans are so alike from state to state,
move so freely around the country, and inhabit such a culturally
homogenizing environment, that any true character differences that may
have existed between the states in the past have surely disappeared.
Consciously or not, Americans now define themselves, and articulate
and debate their identity, on a national level. 12 To maintain the contrary
is, as Paul Kahn has so felicitously put it, to indulge "a romantic
longing for vibrant local communities."' 13
The foregoing critique of state constitutional discourse focuses on
what state constitutions are not-they are not vital expressions of the
fundamental values of distinct polities, nor are they reflections of the
unique character of the peoples of the states. But it is easy to say what
state constitutions are not; the harder task is saying what they are, and it
is to that task that the participants in this Roundtable have turned their
attention.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO TRADITIONAL STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Hans Linde: State Constitutions Are "Just Law"
Justice Hans Linde agrees that state constitutions are not
constitutions in the strong sense of the term. The diversity of state
constitutional provisions and bills of rights, he says, contradicts any
"universalist illusions" 14 that state constitutions embody truly
12. Id. at 823-30. Some do not find this argument persuasive. David Schuman has
argued that it does not apply to Oregon, whose constitution does contain "significant
peculiarities of text revealing local character," and which can be understood as "inform[ed]
• . . with local values and traditions." David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State
Constitutionalism, 91 MICH. L. REv. 274, 278 (1992). I don't live in Oregon, but from
this distance I can't quite see what he's talking about. For example, back East we have read
quite a bit lately about significant grassroots efforts around Oregon to enact legal
proscriptions against homosexuals. E.g., Jeffrey Schmalz, The 1992 Elections: The
States-The Gay Issues, N. Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1992, at B8; Oregon Lawmakers Ban Local
Votes on Gay Bias, N. Y. TIMES, July 30, 1993, at A10. These do not seem like the actions
of a state populace imbued with the tolerant frontier spirit of rugged individualism that
Schuman has elsewhere described. See David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional
Law Cases: A Report From the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 275, 285
(1989). On the contrary, it seems like just another manifestation of a national trend
among the religious right.
13. Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106
HARV. L. REv. 1147, 1147 (1993) [hereinafter Interpretation and Authority].
14. Hans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on




fundamental values. 15 State constitutions are not epic social texts; they
have "no 'Founders'; no Federalist Papers; no equivalence of
constitution and nationhood; no singularity. ' 16 Indeed, the residents of a
state cannot really be termed a "people" in the constitutionalist sense
because "our state boundaries do not follow ethnic, linguistic, or
religious lines." 17 A state itself is thus not a distinct polity, but merely a
"territorially defined legal system" 1 8-an artificial rather than an
organic entity.
Fair enough, but if a state constitution is not really a constitution,
what is it? Linde's wholly unsatisfying answer is that "state
constitutions are law," and that courts "become responsible for it [the
state constitution] as for any other law." 19 This response ducks the real
question: what kind of law is a state constitution, and what, in
consequence, is the right way to interpret it? Linde is willing to go so far
as to argue, quite convincingly, that state constitutional law is not a form
of common law; because it is a text, "made by others than the
judges,"' 20 a state constitution is therefore a form of positive law.21 But
the question remains: what kind of positive law is a state constitution?
Here, Linde's analysis simply runs out. "Why," he asks rhetorically,
"should independent [positive] state constitutional law" reflect
"variations in the states' contemporary 'character' any more than
independent tort law or taxation or land use systems?" 22 The answer is
that state constitutional law is not tort law or tax law or land use law.
State constitutional law is constitutional law, or claims to be, and to
claim that something is constitutional law is to claim for it certain
attributes-for example, that it constitutes and reflects the character of
the sovereign people who created the constitution.
What Linde seems to miss is that neither "law," nor even "positive
law," is something apart from the manner of its interpretation. Part of
what makes something "positive law," that justifies the attachment of
the label, is our independent conclusion that the law in question should
be interpreted in certain ways and not in others. That is why Linde's
15. Id. at 931.
16. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus-Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REV. 165, 197 (1984) [hereinafter E Pluribus].
17. State Constitutions, supra note 14, at 954.




22. Id. at 931.
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charge to the academy to help judges in the enterprise of "apply[ing]
and enforc[ing] the actual guarantees that a state's charter provides" 23 is
not aided by telling judges that their state constitutions are some form of
"law" or "positive law." The paradigm of positive law is a statute.
Should a state constitution be interpreted like a statute? Perhaps, but a
state constitution is not a statute-it is a state constitution; it is not
enacted by a legislature, but ratified by the populace of a state. Surely
that has implications for how we should treat state constitutions; and if it
does not, we need to know why not in order to interpret these strange
documents properly.
I suspect that Linde does not supply what he himself calls for
because he is ultimately ambivalent about the "constitutionality" of state
constitutions. He argues forcefully, both here and in previous writings,
that state constitutions should be interpreted according to what is now
commonly called the "primacy" approach. 24 According to this
approach, judges should interpret state constitutions independently of
the federal constitution, and should do so in a principled way that takes
account of the text, history, structure, and underlying values of the
document. This is the classic method of constitutional interpretation, 25
and Linde is clearly urging judges to treat state constitutions like
constitutions. But why should they? If it is true, as Linde argues with
equal force, that state constitutions are only pseudo-constitutions, why
should judges approach them like constitutions? What, for example, is
wrong with judges beginning their analysis of state constitutions by
copying federal doctrine? This might well be inappropriate for a "real"
constitution like the federal one, but for a document that is merely some
bizarre form of positive law-why not?26 In any event, Linde's
ambivalence prevents him from confronting the basic problem: how
courts should interpret state constitutions depends on what state
constitutions are. Unfortunately, that is just what he declines to specify.
23. State Constitutions, supra note 14, at 956.
24. Id. at 929; E Pluribus, supra note 16, at 178-81; Hans A. Linde, First Things
First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REv. 379, 380, 392 (1980).
25. For an overview of the methods of constitutional interpretation, see PHILIP
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 1-108 (1991).
26. Indeed, I shall offer in Part IV a justification of sorts for just the type of lockstep
analysis that Linde decries. See infra notes 76-99 and accompanying text.
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B. James Pope: The "Mixed" State Constitution.
Professor James Pope has no such reservations; he tells us in no
uncertain terms what state constitutions are. On his account, most state
constitutions consist of two distinct types of provisions: those that are
"constitutional" in the traditional, Marshallian sense of "heroic
origins... high purpose... structural elegance... and the aspiration
'to endure for ages to come"; 27 and those provisions that are merely
"constitutional" in that they lack constitutional majesty and take up
"details like age minimums for public officials. ' 28 A state constitution,
then, is a set of genuinely constitutional provisions mixed with a bunch
of what are essentially statutory provisions that have found their way,
often regrettably, into the text. This approach not only commits to a
normative account of the nature of state constitutions, but has the
additional virtue of giving concrete guidance to judges seeking to
interpret state constitutions. Constitutional provisions, Pope explains,
should be interpreted like constitutions, and "merely constitutional"
provisions should be interpreted like statutes. 29 Although this
prescription, as Pope points out, by no means solves the problems that
judges might encounter when interpreting either constitutions or
statutes, it at least leads them onto familiar fields of judicial analysis.
Pope's project here is clear: he wants to "save" state constitutions
by redefining them. The state constitution is not to be understood as
everything between the title and the signatures; rather, it is to include
only those provisions, however few in number, that make up the
"constitutional core."' 30 These are the provisions that possess the
dignity that constitutionalism demands-the ones enacted by the people
of the state acting in that perspicuously sovereign and reflective mode
that we associate with constitution-making. 31
Pope's analysis has an undeniable appeal. It would allow us to
continue thinking of state constitutions (properly defined) as the
considered instructions of the sovereign people of the state. This would
not only preserve the doctrine of state constitutionalism, but would
27. James G. Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS
L.J. 985, 985 (1993) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415
(1819)).
28. Id. at 986.
29. Id. at 1004.
30. Id. at 1002.
31. Id. at 988-89.
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persuasively explain the examples cited by Pope-Jacksonian
democratic reforms, the institution of direct democracy, free
education 32 -that seem to amount to "real" constitution-making on the
state level. Although I believe Pope's observations are partly true,3
3 I
think that his theory suffers from a fatal flaw: he has assumed the very
question in issue-namely, whether a state constitution is a constitution,
or as Pope would put it, a constitution.
Pope argues that constitutions deserving of the name are
distinguished by two criteria: breadth of principle, and enactment by the
people. 34 While these could well be necessary conditions for the
creation of something that we would recognize as a constitution, it
seems to me that they are not sufficient. What makes something a
constitution is not its content or its pedigree, but the current attitude of
the people toward it. The key is function: if the people treat a document
as constitutive of their society, if they accept its authority and role, if
they view it as a legitimate and authoritative source for the resolution of
important social questions, then and only then is the document a
"constitution" as we understand the term.
The problem with state constitutions is that they are not commonly
thought of in this way. Either they are not thought of at all, or, as
Professor Williams has pointed out, they are too often thought of as
mere tools in the game of big money influence over the public policy
apparatus. 35 The Massachusetts Constitution provides an apt example.
Here is a document that looks like a constitution, contains broad and
inspiring principles, and at the time of its adoption in 1780 was
presumably the object of enough public attention to satisfy Pope's
requirement of popular enactment. 36 Yet today, the document is all but
ignored not only by the people of the state, but by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court as well. 3 7 What throws doubt on the
constitutional status of the Massachusetts Constitution is not its failure
to meet Pope's criteria, but the fact that it seems to serve no particular
function. Indeed, if the United States Constitution were to lose the
32. Id. at 991-94.
33. I shall say more about this in Part IV; see infra notes 76-99 and accompanying
text.
34. Id. at 988.
35. Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 169, 175 (1983); see also Pope, supra note 27, at 1005.
36. Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American
Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911 passim (1993).
37. Gardner, supra note 1, at 785-86, 788-89, 793.
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public prestige it now enjoys and to cease serving as a national focal
point for debates on social values, it would no longer be a constitution in
the Marshallian sense no matter what its nominal authority as a source
of governmental power.
38
C. Paul Kahn: State Constitutions As Local Articulations of National
Values
What we need to make sense of state constitutions is a more
dramatic break with traditional notions of state constitutionalism.
Professor Paul Kahn offers just such a vision. According to Kahn, each
state constitution is, in large part, an effort to realize within the particular
community the common ideal of constitutional governance. 39 For
Kahn, the "common object" of state constitutional law is "American
constitutionalism," and each state court "has the authority to put into
place, within its community, its unique interpretation of that common
38. I have an additional reservation about Pope's account even on its own terms.
Pope suggests that courts take up the task of distinguishing between "constitutional" and
"constitutional" provisions. Pope, supra note 27, at 994-95; see also Schuman, supra
note 12, at 277-78 ("courts in most instances should have no difficulty distinguishing
between fundamental constitutive provisions and other, statute-like provisions which
happen to be located in a document styled a 'constitution'). It seems to me exceptionally
risky to confer on courts the power to decide which provisions in a constitution are
"really" constitutional and which are not. The purpose of a written constitution is to serve
as a set of constraining instructions to government officials, instructions which they are
not free to abrogate or defy. Allowing state courts to decide which provisions are binding
in the strong constitutional sense seems to undermine the primary purpose of having a
constitution.
Moreover, such a process could easily subvert popular attempts to implement real
constitutional change by institutionalizing a conservative judicial bias against unusual or
innovative constitutional provisions. This is because Pope's criteria rest ultimately (as
they must) on a normative vision of constitutional substance. Pope claims to have
finessed this problem by denying that the "subject matter" of constitutional provisions is
a proper criterion for distinguishing "constitutional" from "constitutional" provisions.
Pope, supra note 27, at 994. But I doubt that courts can easily bracket the subject matter of
constitutional provisions from their other features. For instance, Pope claims that full-
blown constitutional provisions are characterized by breadth of principle. But it is hardly
self-evident when a principle is broad or narrow. More importantly, should some future
form of constitutional innovation result in the adoption of constitutional provisions that
seem narrow according to prevailing standards of constitutional-principle-breadth, courts
could inadvertently thwart the innovations, even if they represent sincerely and strongly
held popular beliefs about the way in which popular self-government should be conducted.
39. Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1160; see also Paul W. Kahn, Two
Communities: Professional and Political, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 957, 957-58 (1993)
[hereinafter Two Communities].
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object."' 40 On this view, state constitutions are not expressions of the
distinctive fundamental values or character traits of a set of
heterogeneously sovereign peoples. Rather, state constitutions are
simply local articulations of national values; they express not our
differences, but our fundamental commonality and our mutual
commitment to a shared national project.
4 1
I think Kahn is right in an important way-I shall make clear how
in Part IV-and in taking this position he has advanced the debate over
state constitutional law several steps in the right direction. The problem
with his presentation, however, is that it is incomplete. In saying that
state constitutions are local articulations of national values, Kahn has
provided a good external description of state constitutions; but what is
needed is a justification for this conclusion, a justification internal to the
practice of state constitutional adjudication. Kahn correctly points out
that interpretive authority in our legal system is pluralized among state
and federal courts,42 but he never says why this is the case. It is not
enough to tell judges that they have interpretive authority; they need to
know how to use it, and in order to know this, they must know why
they have it. Only by providing a more complete account of the
interpretational authority of state courts will theorists succeed in.
responding to Justice Linde's legitimate plea to assist state judges in
applying and enforcing the terms of the state constitution. 43
At this point, however, Kahn's argument takes a strange turn: the
type of account I have just described is precisely what Kahn denies that
theorists can or should provide. Theory, he says, is merely a strategy of
power. 4 4 The job of the theorist is to "contest power through
40. Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1148.
41. Professor Barry Latzer expresses a similar view, but I think his position
collapses into Kahn's. Latzer contends that state constitutions are part of a "vast
American constitutional dialectic [which] is an ongoing and vibrant debate about
American values and how best to achieve them." Barry Latzer, A Critique of Gardner's
Failed Discourse, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1009, 1017 (1993). But Latzer seems to attribute
divergences between the state and federal constitutions primarily to disagreements over
how best to implement what he seems to view as a stable and uncontroversial core of
American values. Id. at 1014-16. I think that the distinction between constitutional values
and their means of implementation is not nearly so clear and uncontested as Latzer
implies. Values and their means of implementation affect each other; certainly a stingy
implementation of a constitutional value can be seen as repudiating the value itself, just as
a generous implementation can be understood to reflect a substantively more expansive
value. I thus prefer Kahn's more general formulation.
42. Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1166-67.
43. State Constitutions, supra note 14, at 935-46, 951.
44. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 965-70.
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discourse, ' 45 and for the theorist to deploy theory to explain or justify
the use of state power not only shows him to be coopted by the state,
but casts him as a veritable "agent[] of state power."'4 6 Kahn's
argument presents a serious challenge to the premises that inform the
entire debate over state constitutional law (as well as federal
constitutional law). Because I think Kahn's challenge is one that should
be taken seriously, and because doing so will help illuminate the nature
of my own project, I shall digress in the next section to address briefly
Kahn's view of the nature of constitutional theory.
III. THE REQUIREMENTS OF THEORY
Kahn's critique implicates issues of constitutional interpretation and
theory that are far too complex to address completely here. I shall
attempt to sketch only the outlines of a response. My position, in brief,
is that Kahn is led to an unduly despairing view of the possibilities of
constitutional theory by a misunderstanding of the aims of discourse-
based theories of community, by an exaggeration of the significance of
the distinction between speech and action, and by a failure to recognize
the distinction between interpretations backed by authority on the one
hand, and authoritative interpretations on the other.
A. Kahn's Account
Kahn offers an exceedingly bleak portrait of the legal system: courts
are little more than predators, lawyers and theorists form an ineffectual
priesthood trying vainly to placate the rapacious courts, and the general
public is no better than a victim, dependent on the power of lawyers for
protection and hating them for it. What leads Kahn to such a depressing
point of view? To retrace his steps, we must go back to some of his
prior work, on which his article in these pages builds.
Kahn's point of entry into the debate on state constitutionalism is
contemporary constitutional theory, specifically the kind of discourse-
based theory of community on which I relied to critique state
constitutional discourse. He sees these theories as natural and perhaps
inevitable outgrowths of modem constitutional theorists' unsuccessful
attempts to reconcile individual autonomy and majoritarianism. 47 In
45. Id. at 968.
46. Id. at 970.
47. PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY 135, 170, 171 (1992).
1993] 1035
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Kahn's view, communitarian theories seek to effect such a
reconciliation by grounding the authority of the courts in a theory of
interpretation. 48 Like its predecessors, however, this effort also fails, 49
leaving judicial authority ungrounded. When judicial authority is
ungrounded, lawyers and theorists become mere strategists desperately
trying to contain free-ranging judicial power.50 But these efforts, too,
must fail because the puny tools that lawyers and theorists have at their
command-legal arguments and theories, that is, mere speech-cannot
possibly restrain the very real, raw power exercised by courts as
instruments of state authority.5 1
B. Discourse-Based Theories of Community
Although this account is coherent, it suffers from several flaws.
First, I think Kahn is mistaken about the aims of discourse-based
theories of community. They are not, as he claims, attempts to
legitimize judicial power by grounding judicial authority in a theory of
interpretation. Such a project would be doomed to failure at the outset
because it would be incoherent. I must confess that I have some
difficulty figuring out what it might mean to "ground" political
authority in a theory of interpretation; political authority must by
definition be grounded, if a theoretical grounding is needed, in some
notion of politics. To claim that political authority finds its justification
in a community of discourse would be to claim, in essence, "We talk,
therefore we have authority." But this is an illogical leap. Such a claim
48. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 969; KAHN, supra note 47, at 209.
49. KAHN, supra note 47, at 171-209, 222-23.
50. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 969.
5 1. Id. at 965. In the most general way, Kahn's account is deterministic-"it's all
about power"-and, like other deterministic views, it is useful for some purposes but not
for others. For example, deterministic theories are very good at staving off guilt and
despair; if you know that everything is foreordained then you need not feel accountable for
the repercussions of your actions, nor need you fret about the apparent randomness of life.
What such theories cannot do, however, is provide reasons for action. When I am hungry
for lunch and cannot decide whether to order pastrami or corned beef, it does me no good to
know that whatever choice I make will have been preordained-I still must choose.
Similarly, in this context, Kahn's account is not particularly useful for most of the
purposes which a court, lawyer or legal theorist might want to pursue. It does courts and
lawyers no good to know that their actions are all part of some grand power struggle; that
information provides them with no way to decide how to act in situations that call for
applications of power.
For a deft attack on deterministic theories, see ISAIAH BERLIN, Historical
Inevitability, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 41 (1969).
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could be true only in the trivial sense that every community of discourse
inescapably defines the terms in which its members understand the
world. Such "authority" is not the same as political authority and has no
implications for its exercise within the community.
The real purpose of discourse-based theories of community, it
seems to me, is to demonstrate the contingency of forms of social
organization, thereby deprivileging contingent truths and freeing
critique. 52 Although this project is based on an assumption that it is
good for a political order to be subject to the freest possible critique, and
that more critique is better than less, it by no means follows that all
critique is equally good or valuable. Criticism-discourse, talk-is
valued not for its own sake, but for its substance. That is, the freeing of
critique does not free it from its burden of persuasion. This means that
critique must be substantive, and must therefore rest on some
foundation other than itself. In our society, successful substantive social
critique must typically rely on some kind of normative claim invoking
justice, morality, politics, science, or some other belief system whose
authority has been established independent of the mere existence of the
critique or discourse itself. In other words, the authority of discourse is
derivative: to be powerful, discourse must be persuasive discourse;
critique must be good critique.53
It is true, of course, that discourse theories are inconclusive in that
they postulate no particular content to a community's discourse. But
Kahn is mistaken when he takes this inconclusiveness to mean that
discourse theories leave judicial authority ungrounded. Not so.
Discourse theories simply provide that judicial authority is grounded in
any community in whatever way the community has chosen to ground
it. In a post-Enlightenment society like ours, that usually means a theory
of political legitimacy; and in most of the western world a theory of
political legitimacy usually means a theory of consent. That is why I
was careful to define constitutionalism as a theory of political legitimacy
based on popular sovereignty, 54 and why the account of state
constitutions I propose to develop in Part IV will rely on federalism, a
concept that comes with a distinguished pedigree of independently
established political legitimacy.
52. See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE
POLMCS OF LAW 414, 420-21 (David Kairys ed., 1990).
53. This is the lesson of hermeneutics. See generally HANs-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH
AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall rev. trans, 2d ed. 1989).
54. Gardner, supra note 1, at 814-15.
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,C. Authority and Interpretation
Kahn also makes far too much of the distinction between authority
and interpretation; that is, between speech and action. It is true in an
important sense that a punch in the nose trumps an argument, but this is
not quite as significant as Kahn suggests because authority is itself a
social construct. 5 5 Actions may exist beyond words, but to be
understood, actions must be interpreted, and such interpretation occurs
through language. While the exercise of authority, as Kahn points out, is
"different from the discourse itself,"56 the exercise of state authority is
nonetheless imbedded in, and largely created by, interpretation. What is
to count as authority? When has it been exercised? By whom? To
answer these questions requires interpretation. If my neighbor applies
for a zoning ordinance to open a pig farm, the town grants it, and I am
subjected to unhealthful, noxious odors, have I been subjected to
"authority"? If so, is it the authority of the state or the authority of my
neighbor?
Only interpretation makes possible even the seemingly brute
conclusion that one has been subjected to violence. In his book Is There
a Text in This Class?, Stanley Fish quotes a wonderful passage from a
story by William Golding about a struggle between two prehistoric
tribes:
The man turned sideways in the bushes and looked at Lok along his
shoulder. A stick rose upright and there was a lump of bone in the middle.
Lok peered at the stick and the lump of bone and the small eyes in the
bone things over the face. Suddenly Lok understood that the man was
holding the stick out to him but neither he nor Lok could reach across the
river. He would have laughed were it not for the echo of screaming in his
head. The stick began to grow shorter at both ends. Then it shot out to full
length again. The dead tree by Lok's ear acquired a voice. "Clop." His
ears twitched and he turned to the tree. By his face there had grown a
twig.
5 7
55. Stanley Fish has argued that "interpretation is always a form of authority, since
it is an extension of the prestige and power of an institution; and authority is a form of
interpretation, since it is in its operations an application or 'reading' of the principles
embodied in that same institution." STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 135
(1989). As a result, "it is not possible to distinguish between them as activities
essentially different in kind." Id.
56. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 965.
5 7. WLLIAM GOLDING, THE INHERITORS 360, quoted in STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT
IN THIs CLASs? 80-81 (1980).
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What this passage describes is one prehistoric person shooting an arrow
at another. But the "victim" of what we "know" to be an attack is
incapable of interpreting it that way because he lacks the conceptual
categories available to one who is familiar with the technology and
conventional military uses of bows and arrows.
The same point can be made about Kahn's example of the citizen
who is called upon to die for his country. According to Kahn, "[t]he
true meaning of citizenship is not constituted by discourse, but by a kind
of speechlessness. Citizenship entails an implicit recognition that there
can come a moment when the state may call for the sacrifice of your life
and... [t]here will be nothing further to say-only the act." 58 But how
can the "true meaning of citizenship" be constituted other than through
discourse? Surely the state's call must be interpreted: Am I a citizen? Is
the state's claim to my life legitimate? Is it just? Shall I obey? And even
when the citizen complies, the act of self-sacrifice does not exist beyond
interpretation: the act has meaning only if it can be understood by those
who remain behind, and they can understand the act only by engaging in
a discourse that makes possible its interpretation.
Speech, then, is more powerful than Kahn admits. Indeed, its power
in the legal system is so great that it has become an invisible
background condition that Kahn all but overlooks. For example, Kahn
says that interpretation "is the only power that lawyers and scholars
have,"' 59 but that's not really true. Lawyers could just as easily try to
win their cases by violence; they could leap over the bench and twist the
judges' arms behind their backs until they signed the relevant orders.
Why don't lawyers do that? Is it only because the state has more bailiffs
and guards and guns at its disposal? The state has these resources, but
surely the fear of superior force is not the only reason that lawyers
attempt to win cases with arguments rather than force. The reason
speech is effective in court is because courts themselves recognize
speech to be powerful. In a courtroom, truth is seen as superior to force,
superior, even, to judicial power itself; as Kahn himself has pointed out,
truth is sometimes seen as the very source of judicial power.60
5 8. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 967.
59. Id. at 969.
60. KAHN, supra note 47, at ch. 3-4; see also Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An
Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860, 1900-05 (1987) (describing potential power




Kahn's sharp distinction between interpretation and authority is
further undermined by another factor, which I shall call "authoritative
interpretation." An authoritative interpretation is simply a socially
binding interpretation issued by a body, like a court, with the socially
recognized power to issue binding interpretations. The concept of
authoritative interpretation is central to my notion of constitutional
discourse, and to a certain extent underlies my entire critique,6 1 so it is
worth elaborating briefly.
Kahn is deeply suspicious of authoritative interpretations, which, in
this context, means judicial rulings. Following in the footsteps of Robert
Cover,62 he is concerned about the role of courts in bringing about "the
end of speech" 63-that moment when the cacophony of contesting
nomoetic interpretations is silenced by judicial invocation of the
crushing power of the state. Judges, he reminds us, "are not just another
claimant to a 'correct' interpretation of law." 64 What distinguishes them
from other claimants is their access to the power of the state and their
use of violence to enforce their views.
It is easy to see how Kahn moves from this point to his conclusion
that courts are nothing more than bullies. Courts are no better or worse
than anybody else, he argues, and neither are their interpretations; 65 the
only difference between us and judges is that the judges have somehow
got hold of the power to make their opinions stick. But this account, it
seems to me, does not do full justice to the complex role played by
courts in our society. The setting in which judging occurs makes the
interpretations of courts qualitatively different from the interpretations of
other actors; the voice of a court is not "just another voice" backed up
by force.
The exercise of judicial power in our society is politically legitimate;
that is, it is socially accepted and recognized as proper. But the conferral
by a society of political legitimacy upon an institution also confers a sort
61. Gardner, supra note 1, at 767-70, 815-16. I have further elaborated this concept
in James A. Gardner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A Communitarian Defense of
Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REv. 805 (1993).
62. Robert M. Cover, The Bonds of Constitutional Interpretation: Of the Word, the
Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. REv. 815 (1986); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word,
95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
63. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 967.
64. Id. at 968.
65. Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1164-65.
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of legitimacy on its interpretations-they are recognized not merely as
the pragmatically necessary end of a political process, but as
authoritative interpretations; they are understood, in other words, as
correct. Thus, the conferral of political legitimacy has more than
political repercussions; it has interpretive repercussions as well. Judicial
decisions have authority not simply as acts of power, but as
interpretations.
This feature of authoritative interpretation sets up a dynamic
interaction between the society which confers legitimacy, and the
legitimated interpreting body-here, the court-whereby the body's
interpretations influence the self-conception of society. In other words,
the process whereby various groups within society generate
interpretations of the law-what Cover called the "jurisgenerative"
process 66-does not take place in some kind of pristine setting
independent of actual judicial interpretations. Rather, judicial
interpretations help constitute the conditions under which jurisgenesis
takes place, and in fact occupy a special role in constituting these
conditions precisely because society understands judicial power to be
legitimate and authoritative.67 To oversimplify somewhat, members of
society are predisposed (though never required, of course) to say: "If
the court ruled that we hold such-and-such values, then, by golly, we
must hold them." Indeed, for an authoritative institution like a court to
make such a ruling is part of what it means for a society to hold certain
values.
If evidence is needed for the existence of such an interaction, we
need only look to the numerous reasons that our society has invented to
justify viewing judicial decisions as the best possible interpretations of
the law. Courts will reach the best interpretations, we are wont to say,
because of their expertise in the law, or their insulation from the political
process, or even the personal wisdom of the judges (this latter reason
seems to have less force in the cynical present than in the recent past). In
another kind of society, people might look to the age, past
achievements, lineage or divine inspiration of the final decision maker to
66. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REv. 4, 11 (1983).
67. Sarat and Kearns make a similar point in Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns,
Making Peace With Violence: Robert Cover on Law and Legal Theory, in LAW'S VIOLENCE
211, 246-249 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1992). See also Christopher L.
Eisgruber, Is the Supreme Court an Educative Institution?, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 961 (1992)
(describing ways in which the Supreme Court uses rhetorical appeals to national identity
to try to influence that identity).
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explain why his or her authoritative interpretations will be the best
available. The point remains the same: the establishment by a society of
a final, politically legitimate interpretive authority is not merely a
political act, but an interpretive one as well.
This is the real sense, it seems to me, in which, as Robert Cover
argued, 68 courts "kill" social interpretations. They do so not merely by
silencing these interpretations through the exercise of superior force, but
by doing something far more devastating: courts decisively defeat such
interpretations by demonstrating authoritatively that they are wrong.
Again, we need not look far for evidence of this process. Many different
groups-women, gays and African-Americans, for example-are
engaged today in intense struggles over the content of their "official"
description. It seems highly doubtful that they would devote such
energy to urging a favored official interpretation in courts and
legislatures if self-interpretation, or the interpretation of private
individuals, were as valuable to them as the official interpretation.
Convincing a court to reach a particular interpretation is far more
effective as a step to establishing a social truth than convincing a private
citizen, or even many private citizens, of the same interpretation.
Finally, the notion of authoritative interpretation helps explain why
Kahn is wrong to view lawyers as a kind of priesthood engaged in a
professional discourse wholly unrelated to the larger political
discourse.69 Courts are political actors, and their ultimate audience is not
lawyers, but the society on whom their continuing legitimacy depends.
Courts, lawyers and citizens are all engaged in different ways in the
pursuit of truth. This is why the much more common contemporary
criticism of legal discourse is not that it is too distinct from political
discourse, but that it is too intimately influenced by socio-political
contingencies. 70
E. Kahn's Theory of State Constitutions
These considerations lead me to conclude, contrary to Kahn, that
theorists should not deploy theory "strategically." Nor do theorists
become tools of state power by failing to resist it at every turn. The line
between theory and advocacy is surely contested, but theory understood
as strategy is simply bad theory. To say that theory is best understood
68. See supra note 66.
69. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 963.
70. This is, for example, the main thrust of the Critical Legal Studies movement.
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as strategy is to say that theory does not make a sincere claim to truth.
But legal theorists who wish to influence the actions of courts,
something that Kahn urges them to do,71 must address courts in terms
that courts recognize as powerful-that is, truthful.
Kahn has offered a theory of state constitutions according to which
state constitutions are local articulations of national values. 72 He
suggests that his theory is strategic because it merely represents his
exhortation to state courts to use their power to counter the hegemony of
federal courts in the arena of constitutional law.73 But what actually
makes Kahn's theory strategic is his failure to support it with any kind
of recognizable justification. 74 Maybe courts should interpret state
71. Two Communities, supra note 39, at 965-70.
72. This view also forms the basis for Kahn's theory of state constitutional
interpretation. Because state constitutions are local articulations of national values,
courts interpreting state constitutions should not confine themselves to the use of "unique
state sources," but should look to national values and the terms of the national debate as
well. Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1153-56, 1165-67.
73. E.g., Interpretation and Authority, supra note 13, at 1166 ("A state court
interpreting American constitutionalism is . . . a powerful counterforce to federal court
interpretation of the United States Constitution."); Two Communities, supra note 39, at
967-68, 968 (a state court "may be willing to use its authority to confront the institutions
of national political authority and to contest the meaning of American political life").
74. The positions of Professors Burt Neuborne and Earl Maltz suffer from a similar
defect. Neuborne, here as well as in his previous writings, argues that state courts should
protect individual rights. Burt Neuborne, A Brief Response to Failed Discourse, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 971 (1993) [hereinafter Brief Response]; Burt Neuborne, State Constitutions
and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989). But why should they
do so? Neuborne's answer seems to amount simply to the assertion that they should, or
that it would be good in some kind of unexplained, self-evident way for them to do so.
This is what gives his arguments the kind of instrumental character that has so often been
criticized in the debate over state constitutional law. See, e.g., Earl M. Maltz, The
Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L.
233 (1989); G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation,
22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 845-46 (1991).
Earl Maltz's views are more complex, but ultimately suffer from a similar lack of legal
justification. In particular, what his writings on state constitutional law omit is any
concept of constitutional interpretation as a legal practice. For Maltz, state courts exist in
a politically self-conscious world in which they act for instrumental reasons that
transcend their institutional setting. Thus, state courts engaged in judicial review must
"decide whether to displace" legislatively adopted rules, Earl M. Maltz, James Gardner and
the Idea of State Constitutionalism, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 1019, 1023 (1993), whether "to be
activist," Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496 ANNALS
98, 100 (1988), and what "type of judicial review [to] employ[]." Earl M. Maltz, The Dark
Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 1000 (1985). They make these
decisions not incidentally in the course of doing their best to interpret the constitution,
but deliberately. Indeed, Maltz's state courts seem not to interpret the constitution at all,
but rather to engage in certain kinds of judicial behavior the propriety of which is to be
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constitutions as local articulations of national values-but why? Why is
this the truth of what state constitutions are?
In fact, there are sound reasons for rejecting such a view. Kahn's
theory does not explain why we have state constitutions in the first
place. After all, state courts interpret national values when they interpret
the federal constitution.75 If that is all state courts should do when they
interpret state constitutions, then state constitutions are simply
redundant. Surely we should prefer the traditional theory of state
constitutionalism, which at least contemplates a non-redundant role for
state courts and constitutions.
On the other hand, when state courts interpret the Constitution they
do so as lower courts, whereas they have the final say when construing
their own state constitutions. The relevant difference for Kahn, then, is
not in the nature of the interpretive act, but in its authority. Yet this is a
strange situation. It is one thing to authorize many bodies to interpret the
same text, but quite another to grantfinal interpretive authority over the
same text to more than one body. This seems like a prescription for
anarchy; why would any rational system of governance pluralize
interpretive authority in this way? This, it seems to me, is the key
question that must be answered by any successful theory of state
constitutional law, and it is the question to which I now turn.
IV. FEDERALISM AND THE PLURALITY OF INTERPRETIVE AUTHORITY
A. The Federalism Framework
The doctrine of state constitutionalism invites us to think of
federalism as a system based on, indeed required by, the natural right of
all self-identified societies-in this case the states-to govern
themselves as they see fit. This is the classic theory of the Declaration of
Independence. 76 But there is another, more promising way to think
measured not by standards internal to the judicial practice of constitutional interpretation,
but by a kind of social utilitarian calculus. Maltz, The Dark Side, supra, at 1002-16. This
type of reasoning may be perfectly appropriate and useful to political science, but it fails
to provide the kind of reasons for action required by actors in the legal system.
75. The power of state courts to construe the federal constitution has been settled
since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
76. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). This account is made all
the more appealing by the historical circumstances of the nation's founding. As Gordon
Wood writes in his contribution to this issue, "by the time of Independence a man's
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about federalism: as a purely instrumental means of protecting the
liberty of all Americans from invasions by government. This is the
theory of The Federalist No. 51.77
In No. 51, Madison defends the constitutional principle of
separation of powers. Tyranny, he says, is the concentration of all
governmental powers in the same hands.78 To protect the liberties of the
people from the dangers of tyranny, the Constitution not only divides
governmental power, but does so in a way that provides each branch of
government with the power and incentive to struggle against the others;
"[a]mbition," he says, "must be made to counteract ambition. '79 But
the nation's decision to make the United States into a compound, federal
republic provides it with an additional advantage:
In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted
to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are
guarded against by a division of the government into distinct and separate
departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered
by the people is first divided between two distinct governments, and then
the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people.
The different governments will control each other, at the same time that
each will be controlled by itself.
8 0
On this view, federalism is a governmental structure that is not so much
compelled by the rights of the peoples of the states as it is deliberately
created by the people of the nation to protect their liberties.
Erecting such a system required, naturally enough, that states be
given sufficient power to make them a real, rather than merely a
nominal, check on the exercise of federal power. This requirement has
been amply fulfilled: the states truly possess the independent power to
bring down the entire system if necessary, power that has been
exercised to its full extent only once in our history, during the Civil
War. To an extent that is easy for us to take for granted, the Framers'
creation of a federal system was a breathtaking act of faith-faith that
the states would see that it was in their best interest not to use their great
powers to destroy the nation, but to remain a part of it; faith, indeed, that
'country' was still his colony or state. . . . The states were the political entities that
Americans in 1776 most cared about." Wood, supra note 36, at 911.
77. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison).
78. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
79. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
80. Id. at 323.
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remaining a part of the nation would always be in the ultimate best
interests of every American living in every state.
B. The Exercise of State Power
The mere granting of power to the states is not, of course, sufficient
by itself to achieve the Framers' goal of protecting American liberties.
Presumably, state power must be exercised in particular ways if
federalism is to work as intended. How then ought state power to be
exercised to best fulfill federalism's goal of securing liberty?
To begin with, it is clear that state power cannot protect liberty if it is
exercised arbitrarily. In the Lockean tradition we have inherited, 81 being
subjected to arbitrary government power is the very antithesis of
liberty. 82 This notion is reflected today in the contemporary
constitutional doctrine of substantive due process, which screens
government actions for arbitrariness by requiring every official action to
satisfy at least some minimal standard of rationality. 83 It follows that, to
protect liberty, state power must be exercised for a legitimate purpose.
What might these purposes be?
The exercise of state power helps to protect liberty through: (1) the
direct achievement of good self-government within those areas in which
state governments have power to act; and, (2) the identification and
direct protection of the rights of state citizens, to the extent permitted by
the Constitution. But these are simply the goals that we ordinarily expect
any government to pursue; they are certainly not peculiar to a system of
federalism. From the perspective of federalism itself, the most
important way in which states use their powers to protect liberty is (3)
indirectly, simply by doing (1) and (2)-by engaging in the everyday
processes of good government. That is, the exercise of state power in
pursuit of the goals that any government, including the national
government, seeks to achieve is what makes the states potentially
81. I have spelled out in some detail the extent to which I think the United States
Constitution must be understood as derived from the Enlightenment tradition exemplified
by Locke in James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing Popular
Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 189, 192-213 (1990).
82. Locke viewed arbitrary government as a form of political slavery forbidden by
natural law. JOHN LOcKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 17, 22-24, 135-137,
159-168 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 1952) (1690).
83. E.g., Concrete Pipe and Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust, - U.S.




effective counterweights to national power. The "double security"
described by Madison does not arise so much from some complicated
scheme of complementary powers as it does from a conceptually
simple arrangement whereby the state and national governments
independently police some of the same turf.
This is the sense, incidentally, in which I think Kahn is right to say
that state constitutions are local articulations of national values. 84 When
they act, states are necessarily implementing a local vision of good
government and liberty-that is to say, values-and there is no
particular reason to think that the vision states pursue is substantively
different from the vision pursued on the national level by the federal
government. In a federal system, the mix of state and national
governance merely creates two different avenues by which the same
polity can achieve the same results.
We have seen so far that the purpose of federalism is the protection
of liberty, and that the states exercise their responsibility for protecting
liberty within the federal system through their everyday efforts to
govern in a manner consistent with the requirements of liberty. We may
now ask: what specific actions must a state take to fulfill its role in the
federal system? The answer, at least some of the time, is: none. The
state's responsibility is to protect liberty, but if liberty is not threatened,
if it is adequately protected by other actors and by the national
government in particular, a state need do nothing at all. Put another way,
what makes the state an effective counterweight to federal power is its
potential to step in and exercise its own power independently in order to
curb federal abuses. State power ought never to be exercised for its own
sake-that is, arbitrarily-so a state's duty to protect liberty need not
compel it to act. If a state has any minimum affirmative obligation
under federalism, it is to monitor the actions of the federal government
and assure their consistency with the state's view of what liberty and
good self-governance require. If the state's monitoring suggests to it
that the people's liberties are being adequately protected by the national
government, then the state may fulfill its obligation to protect liberty by
doing nothing.
If this account of state power is correct, one conclusion that follows
directly is that a state should never pursue a policy of differentiation for
its own sake; that is, the state should never exercise its own power
differently from the way the national government has exercised national
84. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
1993] 1047
RUTGERS LAW JOURNAL
power simply to assert some kind of distinct power or identity. Such a
policy amounts to governance for the purpose of asserting power rather
than governance for the purpose of achieving good self-government and
preserving liberty; it confuses the means with the end. Those who
appear to suggest such a strategy-Kahn, 85 Neuborne,86 perhaps even
Justice Brennan87-are doubtless better understood as urging states to
"correct" exercises of national power, not for the sake of asserting state
power, but for the sake of better protecting the people's liberties where
the protection of liberty has been measured against some independent,
and usually unarticulated, normative baseline. Let me put this another
way by anticipating a conclusion to which I shall return shortly: there is
nothing intrinsically wrong with lockstep state constitutional law. If a
state thinks that the national government is adequately protecting the
relevant liberties, the doctrine of federalism provides that the state need
not and should not do anything different; so long as the state maintains
the ability to break step should the need arise, lockstep constitutional
analysis is entirely consistent with the role prescribed for state power by
federalism.
C. What Is a State?
For federalism to work, a state must develop and pursue,
sometimes through action and sometimes through inaction, a
substantive vision of good government and liberty. But what exactly is
the nature of the state that generates these views? What, to put the matter
bluntly, is a state? The somewhat surprising answer is: it depends. In a
federal system, states need not be eternal, unchanging political societies;
rather, the system contemplates far more fluid entities whose essential
nature may change significantly from time to time.
Under the influence of the doctrine of state constitutionalism, we
tend to think of the American states as what might be called "Lockean
sovereigns"; that is, they are the governmental agents of independent
societies exercising their natural right to self-governance. 88 But states
need not be full-blown Lockean sovereigns for federalism to work
properly. As an instrumental means for protecting liberty, federalism
85. See Two Communities, supra note 39.
86. See Brief Response, supra note 74.
87. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
88. See Gardner, supra note 81, at 200-05.
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can function perfectly well even if the states are something less majestic
than state constitutionalism might suggest. All that is necessary for
federalism to protect liberty effectively is that states be granted a certain
measure of power and that they be able to use it; the nature of the state
entity itself is irrelevant.
Indeed, the Framers expressly contemplated that the nature of the
states would not be fixed, but would instead vary with the changing
attitudes of the people. In The Federalist No. 46, Madison, after
remarking that Americans place their faith and trust primarily in their
state governments, observes:
If... the people should in future become more partial to the federal than
to the State governments, the change can only result from such manifest
and irresistible proofs of a better administration as will overcome all their
antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not surely to
be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they may
discover it to be most due .... 89
Thus, Madison suggests that the locus of popular trust will ebb and
flow; the protection of liberty will be self-regulating as the people shift
their trust, and with it the focus of their identity as Americans, from one
champion to the other.
It seems certain that at various times in our history, particularly
during the founding period, Americans identified more strongly with
their state government than they did with the national government. 90
This, I believe, is what accounts for the appeal of James Pope's theory
of state constitutions. 91 It is hard to deny, and should not be denied, that
some instances of state constitution making are best understood as the
result of just the kind of deliberation and social self-identification that
we associate with genuinely constitutive societal politics. Today,
however, the states are not Lockean sovereigns. The people of the nation
seem now to feel that their confidence is better placed in the national
government, and the United States has therefore become the focus of
American identity. Whatever they may have been in the past, the
American states today define adventitious groupings of American
citizens, a "populace" rather than a "people." On the other hand,
nothing in theory prevents the focus of American identity from shifting
89. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
90. See Wood, supra note 36, at 911.
91. See supra notes 27-38 and accompanying text.
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back to the states;92 federalism contemplates and functions effectively in
either scenario.
D. What Is a State Constitution?
Just as the nature of a state varies according to the attitudes of the
people, so too does the nature of a state constitution. When the people
identify so strongly with their states that the states can only be
understood as genuine societies in the Lockean sense, then their
constitutions will be the charters of such societies and will by definition
be "constitutional" in the way that state constitutionalism provides.
When the states take on a lesser status due to the shift of identity from
the states to the nation, as at present, then state constitutions will be
something correspondingly less as well.
93
Indeed, it is not going too far to say that at times like the present,
when American identity focuses on the nation rather than the states,
federalism makes state constitutional law irrelevant by design. This is
not to say that federalism demands that state constitutional law retire
permanently from the legal stage. On the contrary, federalism requires
state power to be permanently available as a potential corrective to
federal abuses. But when the people prefer to put their "confidence" in
the national and not the state government, federalism suggests that the
principal role of states is to wait patiently in reserve for that moment,
should it ever come, when the people's confidence tilts back their way.
This account also helps explain why it is advantageous for states
always to have constitutions that seem on their face "constitutional," at
least in so far as they contain provisions dealing with fundamental
rights. Even if the state constitution is not at any given moment
functioning like a constitution, circumstances could quickly change if
92. I say "in theory" because it seems to me that the conditions of modem life-a
global economy, a global environment, the scale of modem warfare, etc.-make it highly
unlikely that Americans will revert to a genuine state-centered identity. On the other hand,
as recent events throughout the world have shown (e.g., the breakups of Yugoslavia and
Czechoslovakia), people are sometimes willing to sacrifice the advantages of integrated
nationhood for the benefits of a regionalized sense of identity.
93. To be sure, such changes occur within a constrained range. For example, the
Guaranty Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and the
process of popular ratification seem to compel the conclusion that a state constitution
must at all times be understood as a means by which the state populace exercises ultimate
positive control over the organs of state government. Even subject to this limitation, a




the people turn away from the national government and toward the
states. If they do, it will be to the state's advantage to have a charter
document already in place capable of functioning like a constitution-
capable, that is, of bearing the full weight of societal identity.
E. Interpreting State Constitutions
We arrive finally at the ultimate question: in light of federalism and
the nature of states and state constitutions, how ought state courts go
about interpreting state constitutions? Before turning to my own
provisional response, I want to flag a preliminary issue that may
complicate the analysis: whether judicial review means the same thing
under a state constitution as it does under the Constitution. As Justice
Linde has pointed out, state courts differ from federal courts in that they
typically "share directly in governance," at least in the areas of common
law and equity, in ways that their federal counterparts do not.94 This
raises the possibility that state courts might legitimately take a more
active role than federal courts in elaborating constitutional principles.
After all, nothing in the United States Constitution requires a state to
have a written constitution in the first place, and if a state lacked a
written constitution the courts would presumably take an active role in
creating an unwritten one, as they have in England. 95 Even where states
have adopted written constitutions, as all have done, it is at least
conceivable that judicial review in state courts might be less constrained
than in the federal courts by factors like the intentions of the
constitution's framers; perhaps state courts might legitimately rely on
their own views of sound public policy, as they often do in developing
the common law. I shall not attempt to resolve this issue here, but shall
simply assume for purposes of discussion that these factors do not
make a significant difference.
In the account I have given, state constitutions can serve federalism
in two different ways depending on the attitudes of the people: they can
be "active," functioning as genuinely constitutive documents for distinct
state societies, or they can be "dormant," serving as a reserve means of
94. State Constitutions, supra note 14, at 952. This difference seems to flow at least
in part from the fact that state courts tend to be courts of general jurisdiction, whereas
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15
(1976); Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 401-02 (1857).
95. But see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. Perhaps the Guaranty Clause would require state
courts to identify an unwritten constitution.
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protecting the liberty of a society the locus of whose identity and faith in
government is national. This raises a preliminary question of a different
sort: are there two distinct ways to interpret state constitutions, one
when they are active and the other when they are dormant? I think not.
The "activation" of a state constitution, it seems to me, is something
that just happens by itself. It is not a self-conscious decision of
governance, but a conclusion to be inferred from acts of self-governance
taken by the state in pursuit of the goals state power aims to achieve. A
court could never know when it would be appropriate to activate the
state constitution because it would have to know whether the state
citizenry has come to identify itself more with the state than with the
nation. But a court could never know this in advance because the
condition of state constitutional activation or dormancy depends, at least
in part, on what actions the court itself takes. All the court can know at
any given moment is whether some particular action by the national
government comports with the state's conception of liberty and good
self-government. Put another way, whether a state constitution is active
or dormant is a determination external to the practice of judging.
This suggests that there is only one way to interpret a state
constitution, and that is to treat it at all times like a real constitution. Both
the federal and state constitutions are only shells; in order to become
genuinely constitutional they must be filled with the stuff of
constitutionality, a quality that is supplied by the people rather than the
document. Still, the receptacle must be capable of holding what it is
designed to hold. State constitutions may now be in a condition of
dormancy, but to treat them consequently as something less than real
constitutions, to approach them without the reverence to which
constitutions are conventionally entitled and thereby to diminish them,
might well do them significant and perhaps irreparable harm. Should
circumstances change and the people once again "become more
partial" 96 to the state than federal government, the people might find
themselves without an instrument capable of doing the work that a
constitution is required to do.
This, I believe, is why state courts talk about state constitutions in
such strange ways; it is why, to bring the critique. full circle, state
constitutional discourse suffers from so many problems. State courts
are caught in an uncomfortable dilemma. On the one hand, state courts
must talk about state constitutions as though they were constitutions in
96. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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the fullest sense. In order to fulfill their responsibilities in a federal
system, state courts must keep their constitutions in good working order
just in case the courts must deploy the constitutions to counter federal
encroachments on people's liberties. On the other hand, state
constitutions are not currently serving as real constitutions-that
function is presently served by the Constitution-so the full-blown
rhetoric of constitutionalism sounds inappropriate when applied to state
constitutions at this particular historical moment. At best, the disparity
between the rhetoric and the reality of state constitutionalism puts state
judges in the uncomfortable position of giving a bravura performance
for an indifferent audience. At worst, the disparity may cause state
courts to tone down their constitutional rhetoric, or even to avoid it
altogether whenever possible-that is, they may refer to their state
constitutions only infrequently, grudgingly, and vaguely.
While this tension cannot be made to disappear, we can at least put it
in perspective by reconceptualizing state constitutions: we should
understand them less as "constitutions" than as documents ordering the
states' potential to counter national power in a federal system. From this
perspective, some of the interpretive practices for which state courts
have been roundly criticized are much more acceptable. In particular,
there is nothing wrong with state courts looking to federal constitutional
law, adopting the terms of debate used by federal courts, reacting to or
disagreeing with federal rulings on the merits, and even engaging in the
despised "lockstep" analysis. All of these practices are means by which
state courts, operating from within a scheme of federalism, can protect
the liberties of American citizens by monitoring the treatment accorded
those liberties by the national government.
This account finds support in the texts of state constitutions
themselves. One of the often overlooked curiosities of state
constitutions is the apparently deliberate redundancy of state
constitutional bills of rights. Many state constitutional provisions are
word for word identical with their federal counterparts. 97 If we followed
the traditional, Marshallian canons of constitutional construction, we
would be driven to the conclusion that the state provisions must be
97. For example, at least ten state constitutions use precisely the same phrase
("establishment of religion") as the Establishment Clause of the United States
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4; CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3; LA. CONST.
art. I, § 8; MD. CONST., DECLARATION OF RIGHTS art. 36; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 5; S.C.
CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
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construed differently from the federal ones in order to avoid reading
important provisions of the state constitutions as redundant and
therefore meaningless. 98 Yet a reading of state constitutional provisions
mechanically construing them as different from their federal
counterparts is a poor reading-just as poor, in fact, as a reading
mechanically construing them as identical.
This shows the pitfalls of thinking about state constitutions in
traditional constitutional terms. The framework of federalism I have
outlined offers a better explanation for this kind of constitutional
redundancy: state constitutions duplicate federal constitutional
provisions to institutionalize a monitoring process whereby state courts
"shadow" federal court rulings. That is, an identical state constitutional
provision invites (and perhaps compels) state courts to consider the
rulings of the federal courts on the same subject and to come to an
independent judgment on the merits. In so doing, state courts perform
the liberty-protective functions assigned to them by federalism: they
monitor the actions of the national government, and if necessary
intervene.
Of course, as I have already indicated, a state court's charge to
monitor federal rulings is not a charge to disagree with them; if the state
court thinks the federal ruling adequately protects the liberty at stake
then federalism provides it with no cause to diverge from the national
approach. Evidently, in the great majority of state constitutional cases,
state courts seem satisfied with the degree of protection extended by
federal rulings. 99 Finally, it is worth stressing once again that no
amount of divergent state constitutional jurisprudence can transform a
pseudo-constitution into a real one, or convert a populace into a people;
those are things that can be accomplished only by the citizenry, not by
the courts.
CONCLUSION
With the doctrine of state constitutionalism, we have inherited a
conception of states and state constitutions that does not adequately
describe contemporary political reality. This disparity has impaired our
ability to speak usefully about state constitutions. To move beyond this
impasse we must reconsider precisely what state constitutions are.
98. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803).
99. See Gardner, supra note 1, at 778-805.
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The conceptual stalemate can be broken by considering state power
from the perspective of federalism. In The Federalist, Madison sets out
a theory of federalism in which state power is created not in virtue of the
right to self-governance of independent state societies, but as a purely
instrumental means of protecting the liberty of the nation's citizens. The
dual system of state and national governments is thus less a framework
for recognizing distinctive choices made by distinct polities than a
mechanism for providing the same polity with different avenues by
which to implement its conception of good self-government.
The role of state power in this account is to serve as a potential
counterweight to federal invasions of the people's liberty. The way
states fill this role is determined in the first instance not by federalism
itself, but by the attitudes of the people, who can be expected to shift
their allegiance and self-identification between the state and federal
levels as they see fit. In times like the present, when American identity
focuses far more on the nation than the states, the states can perform
their liberty-protective duties under federalism merely by monitoring
federal actions; no particular state actions are necessarily prescribed.
When state constitutions are understood not as "constitutions," but as
documents ordering the state's potential to counter federal power, then
there is nothing intrinsically wrong with state courts construing their
state constitutions by looking to and adopting the corresponding federal
analyses or terms of debate, or even following in lockstep with federal
rulings.
Nevertheless, although replacing state constitutionalism with an
instrumental version of federalism can help state courts justify many of
their current interpretive practices, it cannot provide them with a
completely satisfying state constitutional discourse. State courts, on this
view, must talk about state constitutions as though they were "real"
constitutions in order to preserve them in case the state constitution is
ever "activated" by a shift in the people's trust and self-identification
back to the state level. Until then, state courts seem compelled to talk
about state constitutions that do not exist, however much they may have
existed in the past and may again exist in the future. Federalism thus
both generates and explains, but does not alleviate, the current
unpersuasiveness of much state constitutional discourse.
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